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Abstract 
In theories of grounded cognition, abstract concepts, like concrete ones, are grounded in our 
experiences with the world. However, rather than emphasizing the sensorimotoric aspects of our 
experience as they do for concrete concepts (e.g., coffee), grounded theories emphasize 
situational and internal factors for the representation of abstract concepts (e.g., decision). Despite 
some success in showing that situational and internal factors are important for abstract concepts, 
a mechanism by which such contextual factors are encoded and re-instantiated with the concept 
has yet to be elucidated. The present study sought to make headway on finding such a 
mechanism by using the source memory paradigm to determine whether we attend to episodic 
context more when processing abstract concepts as compared to concrete concepts. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were presented with abstract and concrete words in a (red or 
green) colored box frame and performed a synonym judgment 1-back task at encoding. At 
retrieval, participants were better able to recognize the color of the frame for concrete than 
abstract concepts. In Experiment 3, the colored box frames were replaced with male and female 
voices, which participants were asked to recognize at retrieval. The same pattern of results 
emerged as in Experiments 1 and 2: participants were better able to recognize the speaker at 
encoding for concrete concepts than for abstract ones. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that 
the processing of concrete concepts is more sensitive to simple arbitrary episodic contextual 
detail. If representations of abstract concepts are indeed derived from situational context, the 
contexts may need to be more elaborate, temporally extended, or systematic than the simple 
associations examined here. 
Keywords: concepts, semantic memory, episodic memory, abstract concepts, concreteness 
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Encoding of Episodic Context with Abstract and Concrete Concepts 
Grounded theories of cognition postulate that sensory, perceptual, and motor parts of the 
brain are fundamental to conceptual processing. Grounded frameworks also emphasize the 
importance of context in concept processing (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016), suggesting that the way that a concept is represented depends on the 
context in which it is being processed. For instance, when trying to detect a black coffee on the 
bar amidst other orders of cappuccinos and lattes, its dark brown color (which differs from the 
foamy texture and lighter color of the other beverages) will be more salient than the shape of the 
mug (all the mugs are the same) or its smell (the smell of roasted beans is permeating the room). 
Grounded theories are well-supported for the representation of concrete concepts, laying out a 
clear and convincing framework in which concrete concepts are generally learned through our 
sensory, motoric, and perceptual experiences with the world, encoded as accumulated 
instantiations of those experiences, and processed as re-experiencing or simulating the brain 
states implicated in experiencing the concepts. However, they have difficulty explaining how 
abstract concepts are represented—what sensory or motor attributes could constitute our 
representation of decision?  
Some grounded theories suggest that abstract concept representations rely on emotional 
systems, thus recruiting limbic structures like the amygdala, which are involved in emotion 
processing (Kousta et al., 2011). While this is a powerful explanation for abstract concepts 
involving emotion (e.g., love, bliss), many abstract concepts are non-emotional (e.g., democracy, 
decision), and indeed it might be better to consider an emotion-based continuum separate from a 
continuum from concrete to abstract in semantic representation (Hollis & Westbury, 2016; 
Skipper & Olson, 2014). An account more inclusive of the broad range of possible abstract 
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concepts might instead draw upon another point of emphasis in grounded cognition—context 
sensitivity (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; also see Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016, for 
discussion). In discussing the role of context in processing abstract concepts within a grounded 
cognition framework, it is helpful to consider another term often used interchangeably with 
grounded cognition: situated cognition (see Barsalou, 2003, 2005, 2015; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). 
Returning to our coffee example, if we simulate what it is like to experience coffee whenever we 
process the concept coffee (e.g., in language), we do so within a situated context. That is, we do 
not simulate what coffee is like in isolation, but against the background of the coffee bar (for a 
review, see Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). The precise simulation carried out depends on the context in 
which the concept is being processed, whether the context is situational or linguistic. The effect 
of context on concept processing may be particularly pronounced in processing abstract 
concepts, which do not have direct sensorimotor referents—that is, we cannot directly perceive 
abstract concepts in the physical world. Accordingly, in processing the meaning of decision, we 
might be more sensitive to what is happening in the situation (e.g., a judge deciding on a 
sentence for a felon), or the words that co-occur with decision (e.g., judge, felon, battery), and 
those contextual factors might affect the way that we construe the meaning of decision. As it 
turns out, explaining this distinction between abstract and concrete concepts in terms of reliance 
on context has a long history in cognitive psychology, predating the discussion on how grounded 
theories of cognition can accommodate abstract concepts. We now turn to a brief consideration 
of the historical context surrounding the representation of abstract and concrete concepts, noting 
that the review is not meant to be exhaustive, but only to broadly capture views on concept 
representation which suggest that sensitivity to contextual information, or some associated 
information, might underpin representation of abstract concepts.  
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Classical Views on Abstract and Concrete Concepts 
Concrete concepts are typically processed faster than are abstract concepts. This is 
referred to as the concreteness effect and has been demonstrated at both the single word (e.g., 
Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) and sentence level (e.g., Paivio & Begg, 1971). This has led to 
the suggestion that concreteness is an important organizing factor for conceptual knowledge, 
where abstract concepts may be representationally impoverished in some way. This view is best 
captured by two highly influential seminal theories of concept representation: dual-coding theory 
and context-availability theory. 
Dual-coding theory. Paivio’s (1971, 1991) dual-coding theory suggests that while 
concrete concepts are represented by both linguistic (i.e., abstract; the logogen system) and 
imagistic (i.e., concrete; the imagen system) codes, abstract concepts are represented only or 
primarily by linguistic codes. Essentially, dual-coding theory suggests that abstract concepts are 
harder to process than are concrete concepts because the brain has more devoted resources to 
processing concrete concepts as compared to abstract ones. Specifically, while concrete concepts 
rely on bilateral representation in both the language-dominant left hemisphere and image-
dominant right hemisphere, abstract concepts rely solely on a left hemisphere network (Paivio, 
1991). Dual-coding theory explains well why in neutral contexts we see comprehension time 
advantages for concrete over abstract concepts: simply, there are fewer neural resources devoted 
to processing abstract concepts. However, it fails to explain an important finding: the 
concreteness advantage disappears when a rich context is provided to support abstract concepts 
(see, e.g., Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983).  
Context availability hypothesis. Consider the sentences “Many sailors evacuated the 
sinking vessel” and “Many factors affected the crucial decision.” The former is faster to 
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comprehend in sentence comprehension tasks, and dual-coding theory would suggest that this is 
because the second sentence can only rely on linguistic codes. However, this concreteness 
advantage is diminished or even eliminated when an extended, relevant context is provided (e.g., 
the latter sentence is embedded in a richly informative paragraph, where a protagonist is in line 
at the coffee shop at 9pm debating whether to order another coffee or opt for something more 
soothing like tea or hot chocolate). This suggests that concrete concepts have stronger implicit 
links to context, and that comprehension of abstract concepts benefits from being tied to a 
particular context (context-availability theory; e.g., Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). At its 
root, context-availability theory suggests that comprehension is an ongoing, interactive process 
between the current situation and an individual’s history of knowledge (Schwanenflugel, 1991). 
Abstract concepts have weaker associations to specific contexts in an individual’s history of 
experience, primarily because they occur in such a wide variety of contexts. This context 
variability means that the current situation needs to be highly constraining for fluid 
comprehension to occur. While context-availability theory does well to explain (a) concreteness 
effects themselves and (b) why concreteness effects are eliminated when contextual information 
is provided, it still suffers from critical flaws, saying little about how these differing 
representations between abstract and concrete concepts are instantiated at the neural level.  
Contemporary Views on Abstract and Concrete Concepts 
Neuropsychological work has suggested that there are distinct neural circuits devoted to 
abstract and concrete concepts (Warrington, 1975, 1981; Warrington & Shallice, 1984), a view 
stemming from the observation of a double dissociation between abstract and concrete concepts 
in some patients with aphasia. This suggests that different brain networks underpin abstract and 
concrete concepts, counter to the claim that there are simply fewer resources available for 
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abstract concepts. A related criticism of both dual-coding and context-availability theory is that 
they suggest abstract concept representations to be impoverished (Pexman, Hargreaves, 
Edwards, Henry, & Goodyear, 2007), despite the fact that abstract concepts tend to be versatile 
as well as contextually and semantically diverse (Hoffman, Lambon Ralph, & Rogers, 2013). 
Another major issue with the classical views is a poor specification of the neural architecture 
underlying the representational differences between abstract and concrete concepts: dual-coding 
theory suggests broadly that there is hemispheric asymmetry in the representation of abstract and 
concrete concepts (e.g., Paivio, 1991), while context-availability theory makes no claims about 
how the representational differences between the two emerge, or how these differences manifest 
neurally (Schwanenflugel, 1991). Accordingly, contemporary views on concept representation 
rely on the many tools of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology to better appreciate the 
representational differences between abstract and concrete concepts at a neural level. 
Qualitatively different representations. The qualitatively different representations 
hypothesis (Crutch & Warrington, 2005; see also Warrington, 1981) has its root in 
neuropsychological work showing a double dissociation between comprehension of concrete and 
abstract concepts (Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984), and suggests that the 
representational systems underpinning concrete and abstract concepts have qualitatively different 
organizational properties: while concrete concepts are represented by category (i.e., taxonomy; 
animal  mammal  dog), abstract concepts are represented by association (i.e., theme; time: 
past, present, future). Patients with semantic refractory access dysphasia show interference 
among associated abstract words and among categorically related concrete words, but not vice 
versa, suggesting that abstract concepts rely on associative and not categorical relations (Crutch 
& Warrington, 2005). However, work testing the qualitatively different representations approach 
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in non-impaired populations has failed to find evidence that abstract concepts activate strictly 
associative semantic networks, finding instead that the interference effect of category relations is 
greater than that of associative relations in both abstract and concrete concepts (Geng & Schnur, 
2015), and that concrete words tend to activate associative relationships faster (and more) than 
do abstract words (measured as eye-movement fixations; Brozdowski, Gordils, & Magnuson, 
2013). These findings suggest that abstract concepts likely do not rely exclusively on thematic 
associations. 
Grounded and situated cognition. While the qualitatively different representations 
hypothesis has been challenged by ensuing empirical work, we suggest here that there is at least 
a kernel of truth to its claims: associative relationships by definition rely on cooccurrence (in 
space, time, and language), and it has been suggested that such relations in semantic memory 
rely more strongly on event representations, context sensitivity, and the episodic memory system 
(see Davis & Yee, under review; Mirman, Landrigan, & Britt, 2017). And as outlined at the 
outset, grounded or situated cognition—similar to context-availability theory—suggests that 
abstract concepts are more dependent on contextual information for processing. It is suggested 
that because abstract concepts do not have a spatially circumscribed locus (compare theory to 
coffee), they rely more on the situation than do concrete concepts. For example, in an open-ended 
association task, abstract concepts generated a greater proportion of responses related to 
situations (e.g., communication, social institutions) and introspection (e.g., beliefs), suggesting 
that these contextual factors are important in abstract concept representations (Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Reliance on detailed context, particularly that related to situation 
and/or introspection, is an appealing explanation, and it resonates with classical theories of 
context availability (Schwanenflugel, 1991) as well as the emphasis on association in the 
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qualitatively different representations framework. However, like classical views, grounded 
cognition theories have not offered a specific mechanism by which this sensitivity is instantiated 
at a cognitive or neural level, leaving the theoretical framework underspecified. While 
consideration of the content of abstract concepts is helpful in narrowing down how abstract 
concepts are represented, a focus on the mechanism underlying their processing is critical in 
building a comprehensive theory of concept representation which is broadly inclusive of 
concepts ranging from concrete to abstract. Here, we propose such a mechanism, speculating that 
increased reliance on the episodic memory system, which supports retrieval of contextually 
detailed memories and is supported neurally by the hippocampal system, might serve to ground 
abstract concepts in accompanying contextual detail (i.e., to ‘tune us in’ to context when 
processing abstract concepts).  
Episodic Memory and Context Encoding 
In this section, we explore one possible mechanism for the binding of context to concept 
in abstract concepts: because of the involvement of the episodic memory system in retrieving 
contextually detailed memories and the importance of contextual information in processing 
abstract concepts, we attend more to episodic information when processing abstract concepts. 
Episodic memory is classically defined as explicit memory for unique events, allowing us to 
recall specific experiences (Tulving, 1983, 2002), as compared to semantic memory, which is 
better conceptualized as the aggregate knowledge over a number of experiences with a particular 
entity. Episodic context is the detail that colors a scene. It may be the bag hanging over your 
dining room chair when you walk into the kitchen (this bag likely will not become a component 
of your chair concept moving forward), or it may be the rush of cold air when you succeeded in 
reaching the peak of your first mountain summit (at first glance, that rush of frigid air seems 
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unlikely to become part of your success concept moving forward). In tasks probing the episodic 
memory system, contextual detail is often operationally defined as some aspect of a percept or 
situation that is irrelevant to the central stimulus—in a memory task, this is often operationalized 
as whether a test word is presented in red or green font, whether a line drawing is presented 
within a red or green frame (see Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012), or whether stimuli are 
presented by a male or female voice (e.g., Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  
There are circumstances under which we are more likely to encode, and therefore, recall 
the arbitrary contents of a particular episode (e.g., the color of the frame or font, or the identity of 
a speaker). The standard paradigm for assessing this ability is the subsequent memory procedure, 
a common variant of this being the source memory task (for discussion, see Davachi, 2006). In 
this explicit task, participants are asked to determine whether the item (e.g., a word) was 
presented in an exposure phase, and then probed as to whether they can additionally recognize or 
recall some contextual detail (e.g., font color, frame color, or voice source; Migo et al., 2012; 
Rugg et al., 2012). In such tasks, participants are typically asked how confident they are in 
whether they saw the item at exposure. Greater confidence in having seen a word at exposure is 
associated with greater likelihood of having encoded—and therefore, successfully recognizing or 
recalling—the contextual detail (e.g., Kirwan, Wixted, & Squire, 2008; Yu, Johnson, & Rugg, 
2012). Confidence judgments, the distinction between remembering something and merely 
knowing that you experienced it, and the ability to access specific details of an episode or event 
are thought to probe a fundamental distinction in dual-process theories of the memory system—
that between familiarity and recollection (Jacoby, 1991; for reviews, see Yonelinas, 2001, 2002), 
where familiarity refers to a generalized feeling that some episode occurred, and recollection 
refers to the ability to determine not only that the episode occurred, but also detail of the context 
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in which that episode occurred (e.g., the bag hanging over your chair when you entered the 
kitchen 3 days ago, the rush of frigid air when you successfully summitted that mountain). 
At a neural level, hippocampal activity is consistently observed in tasks probing episodic 
memory, and specifically, it is believed that hippocampal activity is selectively active for 
episodes of recollection, while other neural mechanisms (e.g., perirhinal cortex) might underlie 
familiarity processes (for review, see Yonelinas, 2002; see also Davachi, 2006). However, debate 
exists as to whether hippocampal activity is related purely to strength of the memory (e.g., 
Kirwan et al., 2008; Smith, Wixted, & Squire, 2011) or whether the ability to remember the 
context in which an item was presented at encoding is associated with increased hippocampal 
activation at encoding (for a review, see Rugg et al., 2012). These measures are likely 
confounded to some degree—we are more likely to recall the detail of a situation when we have 
a strong memory of that situation. However, Rugg et al. (2012) suggest that it is not necessarily 
the absolute strength of a memory episode, but rather the amount of contextual information from 
a memory episode, that relates to degree of hippocampal activation. This suggests that the 
hippocampal system is critically involved in relational memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993)—
that is, the process of binding contextual detail (e.g., a colored frame) to a target stimulus (e.g., a 
picture) when submitting these items to memory.  
In addition to confidence in recollection or strength of the memory, emotionality in 
words, including both valence and arousal (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003), influences the likelihood 
of recalling the context in which something was presented, suggesting that the content of the 
stimuli at exposure can influence the likelihood that the context is identified at recognition, and 
more specifically, that conceptual content might affect likelihood of source encoding (and 
consequently, degree of hippocampal activation). In line with the prediction that contextual detail 
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is more important for processing abstract than concrete concepts, this suggests that if contextual 
detail is more likely to be encoded with abstract concepts as compared to concrete concepts, then 
we should also see greater hippocampal activation in abstract concepts as compared to concrete 
concepts. However, it must first be demonstrated that, at a behavioral level, contextual detail is 
encoded with abstract concepts. This is the aim of the present set of experiments.  
The Present Study 
The notion that episodic context is more important for processing abstract than concrete 
concepts generates at least two predictions. First, when processing abstract concepts, we should 
be more sensitive to the episodic context in which they are placed and, in turn, be more accurate 
at retrieving the context when required. Second, there is an implication that the hippocampus, 
because of its criticality in memory/context encoding (for reviews, see e.g., Davachi, 2006; 
Lepage et al., 1998; Rugg et al., 2012), might be particularly engaged in processing abstract 
concepts. The aim here is to determine the relative importance of context in processing abstract 
concepts, as an initial step towards determining the neural circuits that facilitate context binding. 
The present thesis will address this aim only at the behavioral level. To address this aim, we will 
examine whether arbitrary contexts are better recognized when paired with abstract as compared 
to concrete concepts. Because memory is generally better for concrete than for abstract words 
(e.g., Nelson & Schreiber, 1992; Paivio, Walsh, & Bons, 1994; Wattenmaker & Shoben, 1987), 
we hypothesize that memory for concrete concepts will be better, but when abstract concepts are 
recognized, it is more likely that the context will be encoded along with them. Further, because 
high confidence in having seen an item is associated with greater likelihood of encoding the 
context in which that item was placed, we collected ratings of confidence in recognizing the 
word and box, predicting that confidence in having seen the word will be predictive of likelihood 
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of encoding the context. The core experiments here will rely on the source memory paradigm, 
which pairs target stimuli with an arbitrary context, thereafter testing recognition of that context. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 39 University of Connecticut undergraduates (15 men, 24 
women, mean age = 19.3 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants 
provided written informed consent and received course credit for their participation. Three 
participants were excluded because they were not performing the task (i.e., pressed the same 
button on every or almost every trial), leaving a final N of 36. The study was approved by the 
University of Connecticut institutional review board. 
Stimuli. In the encoding phase, 100 (60 target, 40 non-target) abstract (e.g., success) and 
100 (60 target, 40 non-target) concrete object (e.g., chair) concepts were used. Stimuli were 
matched on word length and word frequency based on English Lexicon Project data (Balota et 
al., 2007), and were sorted into abstract and concrete word lists based on Brysbaert, Warriner, 
and Kuperman’s (2014) concreteness norms. Words were randomly assigned a box color prior to 
data collection, with half of the abstract and half of the concrete words receiving red and green 
boxes, respectively. In the recognition phase, an additional 160 words (80 abstract, 80 concrete), 
also matched on word length, word frequency, and sorted by the Brysbaert et al. (2014) 
concreteness norms, were added as distractors. For the full stimulus list, see Appendix 1.  
Procedure. Participants performed a source memory task, which consisted of two phases 
and was designed to test the extent to which an episodic context is encoded when presented with 
a stimulus. Stimuli were presented visually one at a time, in a pseudorandomized order, with an 
arbitrary box context (either a red or a green box). On each word, participants performed a 
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synonym-judgment 1-back task (i.e., “Press the 1 (one) key when the current word is a synonym 
of the previous word, and press the 0 (zero) key when it is not”) to ensure depth of semantic 
processing, while avoiding any potential confounds with concreteness (as would be conferred by, 
e.g., an animacy judgment task). The non-target trials were 20 abstract–abstract synonym pairs 
and 20 concrete–concrete synonym pairs. Stimuli were presented for 2000 ms with an 
interstimulus interval of 1000 ms. Participants were explicitly instructed that there would be a 
memory test on the words, and that they would be asked to recall both the word and the color of 
the box surrounding it.  
In the recognition phase, an additional 160 words were included as distractors. 
Participants performed two tasks for each word, and the words were again presented in 
pseudorandomized order. First, they indicated whether they had seen the word in the encoding 
phase, indicating their degree of confidence in the decision (high, medium, and low confidence 
for either “old” or “new”), as confidence in having seen an item affects the likelihood of 
recognizing the context the item was presented in (e.g., Yu et al., 2012). Second, for old words, 
they indicated the color of the box on initial presentation (again, high, medium, and low 
confidence for either red or green). The task was the same for new words, except that they were 
asked simply to select the color they thought the box would have been had it been presented at 
encoding. Participants were given 3000 ms each for the old/new judgment and the box color 
judgment.  
Data analysis. Data were analyzed using R statistical programming software (R Core 
Team, 2013). Recognition of items (i.e., words) and their contexts (i.e., box color) was first 
analyzed using descriptive statistics, calculating accuracy, hit rate, miss rate, correct rejections, 
false alarms, and d' (calculated as z(Hit) – z(FA)) for all words, and accuracy was also assessed 
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by level of confidence. Box recognition accuracy was calculated only for target hits, and was 
assessed across confidence levels. Box recognition accuracy was analyzed as a function of word 
type and confidence in having seen the word at encoding. We also analyzed response time data 
using the same models in Experiments 1–3. Because these models showed the same patterns as 
the accuracy data—and our hypotheses concerned recognition accuracy and not response 
times—only the models investigating recognition accuracy are reported. Logistic mixed effects 
models (lme4 package; Bates et al., 2017) were used to analyze the data, with subject and word 
as random effects, and word type (abstract or concrete) and level of confidence in the judgment 
(low, medium, high) as fixed effects. Analysis of d' was conducted using paired-samples t-tests, 
with word type as the independent variable.  
Results 
Word recognition. The accuracy and hit, miss, correct rejection, false alarm rates, and d' 
across all words in the recognition phase are shown in Table 1. In terms of overall accuracy, 
there was a significant main effect of word type (β = .34, z = 4.18, p < .001), with concrete words 
responded to more accurately than abstract, and confidence (β = .56, z = 17.34, p < .001), with 
accuracy increasing with higher levels of confidence, and a significant interaction between the 
two (β = .13, z = 2.31, p = .02; see Figure 1). Target (i.e., only non-synonym words presented at 
encoding) recognition accuracy by confidence rating is shown in Figure 2. Among targets only, 
there was a main effect of word type (β = .25, z = 2.02, p = .04), with greater accuracy for 
concrete words, and a main effect of confidence level (β = .76, z = 13.23, p < .001), with 
accuracy increasing with confidence. There was no interaction between word type and 
confidence (β = .14, z = 1.42, p = .16). Finally, d' analysis showed that even when taking 
response bias into account, recognition was better for concrete concepts, t(34) = -7.089, p < .001. 
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Table 1 
Mean Word Recognition Accuracy 
Word type Acc Hit Miss CR FA d' 
Abstract .705 .669 .331 .751 .249 1.216 
Concrete .770 .765 .234 .776 .224 1.616 
Note. CR = correct rejection; FA = false alarm. 
   
Figure 1. Box plot showing the interaction between word type and confidence on all words. 
Solid lines show median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of 
the distribution.  
 
Figure 2. Box plot showing the interaction between word type and confidence in predicting 
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accuracy for target word recognition (i.e., non-synonyms presented at exposure). Solid lines 
show median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the 
distribution.  
Source recognition. In analyzing source recognition, we included only trials for which 
the word had been correctly identified. The main effects of word type (β = .15, z = 1.58, p = .11) 
and confidence (β = .04, z = 0.63, p = .53) were non-significant, as was the interaction (Figure 
3). 
  
Figure 3. Box plot showing box recognition accuracy by word type and confidence rating. 
Confidence rating refers to confidence in having seen the word at encoding. Solid lines show 
median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution.  
Discussion 
As expected, concrete words were recognized better than abstract words were. This was 
true regardless of whether all words (i.e., including fillers and synonyms) or only targets were 
analyzed. Counter to our hypothesis, however, Experiment 1 suggested that source memory was 
better for concrete concepts than it was for abstract concepts, though the effect was non-
significant in the logistic model (p = .11). It may be that this slight advantage is attributable to 
the explicit nature of the task (i.e., where participants were explicitly instructed to remember the 
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word–box color pairings): that is, participants could have used a mnemonic device wherein “red 
table” was more amenable to memory encoding than was “green democracy.” However, the 
accuracy scores were close to chance in both conditions, suggesting that the task was particularly 
difficult, perhaps because of the large number of fillers used and the rapidity of the recognition 
phase. Accordingly, Experiment 2 was designed to ameliorate these issues and investigate the 
possibility that explicit attention to box color drove the marginal concreteness advantage. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 failed to provide evidence that context is encoded to a greater extent in 
abstract than in concrete concepts. Instead, the opposite pattern emerged—context was better 
recognized for concrete concepts. In order to test whether the concrete word advantage was a 
byproduct of the explicit nature of the task in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 utilized an implicit 
task wherein participants only attended to the contextual detail (which was still the red or green 
box) by virtue of performing the task differently depending on whether the box was red or green. 
That is, they were unaware that box color would be part of a later memory task.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 42 University of Connecticut undergraduates (14 men, 28 
women, mean age = 19.5 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who had not 
participated in Experiment 1. All participants provided written informed consent and received 
course credit for their participation. One participant was excluded because s/he did not perform 
the task (i.e., repeatedly pressed a single button throughout the experiment), leaving N = 41. The 
experiment was approved by the University of Connecticut institutional review board. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1, although we eliminated 
nearly half of the original distractor words from the recognition phase set to reduce the difficulty 
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of the implicit task. This means that the recognition phase included only 100 additional words 
(50 abstract, 50 concrete) to those included in the encoding phase. 
Procedure. The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 1, with an encoding 
and recognition phase, the use of box color as context to be encoded, and the use of a synonym 
judgment 1-back task in the encoding phase. However, instead of explicitly instructing 
participants to try to remember the words and the surrounding box color, they were only 
instructed to remember the words. Their response on the 1-back task depended on the color of 
the box, in that they used their left hand to respond to words in a green box and their right hand 
to respond to words in a red box, and on each hand, used one finger to indicate a synonym, and 
another finger to indicate a non-synonym (green boxes: 1 for non-synonyms, 2 for synonyms; 
red boxes: 9 for non-synonyms, 0 for synonyms).  
Data analysis. Data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1.  
Results 
Word recognition. The accuracy and hit, miss, correct rejection, and false alarm rates 
across all words are shown in Table 2. In terms of overall accuracy, there was again a significant 
main effect of both word type (β = .25, z = 2.93, p = .003) and confidence level (β = .75, z = 
22.75, p < .001). Concrete words were better recognized than abstract, and accuracy increased 
with greater confidence, while the interaction was non-significant (β = .09, z = 1.56, p = .11; see 
Figure 4). Target (i.e., non-synonym words presented at encoding) recognition accuracy by 
confidence is shown in Figure 5. Among targets, there was no main effect of word type, but a 
main effect of confidence level (β = 1.47, z = 23.35, p < .001), with words recognized better with 
higher confidence. The interaction was non-significant. Finally, d' analysis showed that when 
considering response bias, accuracy was better for concrete concepts, t(39) = -5.372, p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Mean Word Recognition Accuracy 
Word type Acc Hit Miss CR FA d' 
Abstract .731 .771 .229 .650 .350 1.214 
Concrete .780 .813 .187 .713 .287 1.568 
Note. CR = correct rejection; FA = false alarm. 
   
Figure 4. Box plot showing the interaction between word type and confidence in predicting 
overall word recognition accuracy. Solid lines show median accuracy, boxes show interquartile 
range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution. 
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Figure 5. Box plot showing the effect of word type and confidence in predicting target 
recognition accuracy (i.e., only non-synonym words presented at encoding). Solid lines show 
median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution. 
Source recognition. As in Experiment 1, in analyzing source recognition, we included 
only trials for which the word had been correctly identified. There was a main effect of word 
type (β = .19, z = 2.31, p = .02), where the box was more likely to be recognized for concrete 
words, but not of confidence level (β = .07, z = 1.51, p = .13). The interaction was also non-
significant (Figure 6). Participants were more likely to recognize the box color correctly for 
concrete words as compared to abstract ones. However, because d' scores indicate that when 
taking response bias into account recognition was greater for concrete than it was for abstract 
concepts (see Table 2), there may have been a baseline advantage for recognizing concrete 
words, which would then bias the box recognition models. That is, even though we only 
analyzed box recognition trials on which the target word was correctly recognized, correct 
recognition trials for abstract words may have been less likely to reflect true hits where the word 
was in fact encoded. Accordingly, we also constructed models with d' as a predictor to determine 
whether the effect of word type remained significant after accounting for this baseline 
concreteness advantage. A likelihood ratio test comparing the model with both d' and word type 
versus the model with only d' was significant, χ2(1) = 5.27, p = .02, suggesting that the effect of 
word type, where box recognition was better in concrete than it was in abstract concepts, was 
significant even after accounting for the d' concreteness advantage.  
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Figure 6. Box plot showing box recognition accuracy by word type and confidence rating. 
Confidence rating refers to confidence in having seen the word at encoding. Solid lines show 
median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution.  
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, there was concreteness advantage in word recognition; however, 
unlike in Experiment 1, this was only true among all words (including fillers and synonyms). 
Once the data were analyzed by only targets, this effect disappeared, suggesting that the overall 
accuracy difference was buoyed by a higher false alarm rate for abstract concepts. Abstract 
targets were just as likely to be correctly recognized as concrete targets were. Nevertheless, 
source recognition accuracy was better for concrete concepts—participants were better able to 
recognize the context for concrete than abstract concepts, and this was true even after controlling 
for a concreteness advantage detected in d’. Thus, the results of Experiment 2, like those of 
Experiment 1, ran counter to our hypothesis: source memory was better for concrete words than 
it was for abstract words, even when participants were highly confident in having seen the word 
at encoding (see Figure 6). That is, participants were better able to recognize an arbitrary 
episodic context (i.e., box color) for concrete concepts. As discussed following Experiment 1, it 
may be that concrete concepts are more amenable to a mnemonic strategy wherein a color 
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adjective (i.e., “red” or “green”) could readily be combined with concrete objects (e.g., “table”), 
making source recognition better for concrete words. That is, it is possible that the explicit nature 
of this task promoted unitization (see Jager, Mecklinger, & Kipp 2006; Migo et al., 2012; 
Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman 2007), which is the tendency for the source to be treated as a 
feature of the item rather than as memory for the association of two elements. Under this 
explanation, we might argue that the colored box context is more easily paired with concrete than 
abstract concepts. Thus, it may be that contextual detail is encoded to a greater extent in abstract 
concepts, as initially predicted, but only when that contextual detail is not systematically related 
to concrete objects (where it may be argued that colored boxes are systematically related to 
concrete concepts). A second explanation, which would refute our hypothesis, is that the 
concreteness advantage simply extends to memory for arbitrary contextual details (i.e., 
recollection memory). That is, while we might anticipate that the concrete words would be better 
recognized overall than the abstract words based on a vast body of work demonstrating concrete 
word advantages in both memory and online processing, the present findings may also suggest 
that the advantage extends to the distinction between familiarity and recollection: we are better 
able to encode contextual details with concrete concepts. Experiment 3 was conducted to 
evaluate these two competing explanations. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we utilized a variant of the source memory paradigm, where instead of 
the colored box, the context to be encoded was a male or female voice. That is, concepts were 
presented auditorily, spoken by either a male or female voice, and subsequent recognition was 
conducted on visually presented words (e.g., Wilding & Rugg, 1996). In line with the original 
prediction that contextual detail is encoded to a greater extent in abstract concepts than in 
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concrete ones, it was predicted that, of words correctly recognized in the recognition phase, 
participants would be better at remembering the source of the concept (i.e., male or female voice) 
for abstract than for concrete concepts. This prediction is further buoyed by the finding that the 
percentage of person-related social properties generated in an open-ended associative task was 
found to be significantly higher for abstract (20%) than concrete concepts (6%; Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), suggesting that we might be particularly sensitive to person-related 
contextual detail (e.g., speaker information) in processing abstract concepts.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 42 University of Connecticut undergraduates (7 men, 35 
women, mean age = 18.9 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who had not 
participated in Experiment 1 or 2. Participants provided written informed consent and were given 
course credit for their participation, and the procedures were approved by the University of 
Connecticut institutional review board.  
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 2, but were instead 
recorded by a male and a female voice. There were no differences in the length of the sound files 
between the two speakers, and all files were normalized to a peak amplitude. As with the colored 
boxes, half of the words were assigned to be spoken by a male voice, and half were spoken by a 
female voice. The words that had previously been assigned red boxes were spoken in a female 
voice, and those that had been assigned green boxes were spoken in a male voice (i.e., half of the 
words for each word type were spoken by a male and female voice).  
Procedure. In the encoding phase, the procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, 
except that instead of being told that their response would differ depending on the color of the 
box, they were told that they would respond with their left hand if the word was spoken by a 
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female voice named “Jane” and with their right hand if the word was spoken by a male speaker 
named “Sid.” Thus, like in Experiment 2, participants were not told that they would be asked to 
recall the word–gender pairings. The same synonym judgment 1-back task was employed. In the 
recognition phase, the first judgment—whether the word was in the initial set (old) or not 
(new)—was the same. For the second judgment, participants were asked to indicate whether the 
person who said the word in the initial set was “Jane” or “Sid.” The recognition phase was 
conducted with visually presented words, as in Experiments 1 and 2 (for a similar paradigm with 
auditory encoding and visual recognition, see Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  
Data analysis. Data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Results 
Word recognition. The accuracy and hit, miss, correct rejection, and false alarm rates 
across all words are shown in Table 3. Among all words, there was a significant main effect of 
both word type (β = .17, z = 2.02, p = .04), with concrete words showing better recognition, and 
confidence level (β = .72, z = 23.18, p < .001), with greater confidence associated with better 
recognition. There was also a significant interaction (β = .12, z = 2.23, p = .03; Figure 7). Target 
(i.e., only non-synonym words presented at encoding) recognition accuracy by confidence rating 
is shown in Figure 8. Among target words, there was a significant main effect of confidence 
level (β = 1.66, z = 27.00, p < .001), with greater confidence associated with better recognition, 
but not of word type. The interaction was significant (β = .31, z = 3.12, p = .002). Finally, d' 
analysis again revealed that even after taking response bias into account, recognition accuracy 
was better for concrete as compared to abstract concepts, t(40) = -3.488, p = .001. 
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Table 3 
Mean Word Recognition Accuracy 
Word type Acc Hit Miss CR FA d' 
Abstract .696 .724 .276 .640 .360 1.040 
Concrete .734 .766 .234 .671 .329 1.277 
Note. CR = correct rejection; FA = false alarm. 
   
Figure 7. Box plot showing the interaction between word type and confidence in predicting 
overall word recognition accuracy. Solid lines show median accuracy, boxes show interquartile 
range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution. 
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Figure 8. Box plot showing the interaction between word type and confidence in predicting 
target recognition accuracy (i.e., only non-synonym words presented at encoding). Solid lines 
show median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the 
distribution. 
Source recognition. As in Experiments 1 and 2, in analyzing source recognition, we 
included only trials for which the word had been correctly recognized. There was a main effect 
of word type (β = .20, z = 2.10, p < .05), with voice context better recognized for concrete 
words, and confidence level (β = .25, z = 4.64, p < .001), with voice context recognized better 
with greater confidence, and the interaction approached statistical significance (β = .18, z = 1.77, 
p = .08; Figure 9). Participants were again more likely to recognize the context (this time, voice 
source) correctly for concrete words as compared to abstract ones, and this ability appeared to 
increase with increased confidence in having heard the word at encoding. However, because d' 
was again greater for concrete than it was for abstract concepts (see Table 3), there may have 
been a baseline advantage for recognizing concrete words, which would then bias the voice 
recognition models. As in Experiment 2, we constructed models with d' as a predictor to 
determine whether the effect of word type remained significant after accounting for this baseline 
concreteness advantage. A likelihood ratio test comparing the model with both d' and word type 
versus the model with only d' was significant, χ2(1) = 5.75, p = .02, suggesting that the effect of 
word type, where voice recognition was better for concrete than it was for abstract concepts, was 
significant even after accounting for the d' concreteness advantage. 
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Figure 9. Box plot showing voice recognition accuracy by word type and confidence rating. 
Confidence rating refers to confidence in having seen the word at encoding. Solid lines show 
median accuracy, boxes show interquartile range, and whiskers mark 95% of the distribution.  
Discussion 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, there was a concrete word advantage in overall word 
recognition. As in Experiment 2, however, this advantage disappeared when examining targets 
alone, suggesting that the effect across all words may have been buoyed by a higher false alarm 
rate for abstract concepts. Moreover, counter to our prediction, in Experiment 3, voice source 
was better recognized for concrete than abstract concepts, and again this was the case even when 
participants were highly confident in having seen the word at encoding (see Figure 9). This 
provides support for the interpretation that the concreteness advantage, commonly observed in 
language processing and reviewed at the outset, also extends to episodic memory, at least for the 
recognition of simple and isolated episodic detail. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 do not 
appear to be well explained by the unitization of concept and context being better facilitated for 
concrete than abstract concepts. Below, we discuss possible explanations for the observed 
concreteness advantage, theoretical implications for representation of concrete and abstract 
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concepts, and next steps for empirical pursuits in grounding abstract concept representations in 
the brain.  
General Discussion 
The present set of experiments sought to build on work suggesting that the content of 
abstract concept representations is determined largely by contextual information by investigating 
a potential mechanism by which context is attended to in abstract concepts. In doing so, the 
episodic memory system (and speculatively, the hippocampal system at a neural level), which is 
involved in encoding specific contextual details in memory episodes, was identified as a 
potential candidate for supporting the representation of abstract concepts, and specifically, for 
directing us toward or tuning us in to contextual information when processing abstract concepts. 
To investigate this hypothesis, a source memory paradigm was employed because of its 
association with hippocampal activity (see, e.g., Rugg et al., 2012), and arbitrary episodic 
contexts (either boxes of different colors or voices of different speakers) were paired with 
abstract and concrete concepts to determine whether context is better recognized for abstract 
concepts. Across three experiments, the opposite was true: there was a concreteness advantage 
for recognizing episodic contexts, regardless of whether the context was a colored frame 
surrounding visually presented words or the speaker of auditorily presented words (see, however, 
a near-significant effect in this direction in Experiment 1). Because the words were matched on 
length and frequency, it is unlikely that any lower-level characteristics could explain the effects. 
The findings suggest that simple episodic associations are better encoded for concrete than for 
abstract concepts. 
In spite of these findings, contextual information more broadly is critical for 
understanding abstract concepts—this much is agreed upon across several areas of study, 
ENCODING CONTEXT WITH CONCEPTS  28 
 
including classical work on lexical-semantic processing under context-availability theory (e.g., 
Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983), neuropsychological work suggesting qualitatively different 
representation of concrete and abstract concepts (e.g., Crutch & Warrington, 2005), and research 
investigating grounded or situated cognition (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). 
However, there are differences across these frameworks in terms of the type of context specified 
as being critical to processing abstract concepts, ranging from semantically constraining 
linguistic context in context-availability theory, to thematic associations in the qualitatively 
different representations framework, to meaningful situational and internal factors in grounded 
cognition, and accordingly, the mechanism by which representations of abstract concepts are 
derived from or paired with contextual information has remained unclear. While this study 
sought to uncover a basic mechanism that might unify these approaches (i.e., sensitivity to 
episodic information), the results were unequivocal: there is a concreteness advantage in terms of 
how simple episodic detail in a source memory task is encoded with concepts. In the following, 
we seek to unpack this finding by exploring 1) potential relations between concreteness and the 
episodic memory system, 2) a brief review of neural activation that has been associated with 
concrete versus abstract concepts, 3) cases in which an abstract concept advantage emerges or 
concreteness effects are washed out (i.e., reversed concreteness effects), and 4) potentially 
promising avenues for further exploring the neural representation of abstract concepts. 
Concreteness, Context, and Episodic Memory 
Unsurprisingly, among all words presented at the recognition phase, accuracy for 
concrete words was consistently better than it was for abstract words. This has been shown 
repeatedly in previous work (e.g., Chen & Lin, 2012; Fliessbach, Weis, Klaver, Elger, & Weber, 
2006; Nelson & Schreiber, 1992; Paivio et al., 1994; Wattenmaker & Shoben, 1987; Xiao, Zhao, 
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Zhang, & Guo, 2012). Strikingly, however, this was not the case in Experiments 2 and 3 when 
the data were subsetted to include only target words (i.e., only non-synonym words seen at 
encoding), and moreover, among those targets, context was better recognized for concrete than 
for abstract concepts. This was true regardless of whether the context was a colored box or a 
voice source. Whether this is surprising or unsurprising depends on how one views source 
memory effects: if memory strength and the ability to recall contextual detail are viewed as 
highly confounded, inseparable constructs (e.g., Wais, Squire, & Wixted, 2010), then the effect 
is unsurprising, as concrete concepts presented in isolation are thought to produce a stronger 
memory trace than are abstract concepts. This stronger memory trace would then lead to a 
greater amount of contextual detail recalled. Note, however, that in Experiments 2 and 3 this did 
not appear to be the case for our target words, the only words for which source recognition was 
measured. As discussed in the introduction, one can also view the ability to recall contextual 
detail as a process independent of memory strength, as we have in this experiment (and as 
discussed in, e.g., Rugg et al., 2012; see also Vilberg & Rugg, 2007, 2009). On this view, there is 
an effect beyond that of memory strength to be explained. In this case, the results have 
interesting implications for how we think about concreteness effects and how far such effects 
extend in memory processes.  
Concreteness is a powerful organizing factor in semantic memory (e.g., De Deyne, 2017; 
Hollis & Westbury, 2016). As discussed at the outset, concreteness effects are near ubiquitous in 
semantic processing. The present results suggest that such effects extend beyond stronger 
memory for concrete concepts, to better relational memory for concrete concepts, at least when 
the relation to be studied is a simple, arbitrary associated context. One important consideration 
here is the way in which we might expect context to be differentially recruited for processing 
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concrete and abstract concepts, as this has implications for the relation between context 
sensitivity and concreteness. In a review of the pervasiveness of context effects in cognition and 
perception, Yeh and Barsalou (2006) present two primary theses for how context affects 
conceptualization: first, contexts and concepts mutually activate each other, such that when 
processing a context, associated concepts are activated, and vice versa; and second, when 
processing a concept in a particular context, properties of the concept which are relevant to that 
context become active. These two theses have different implications for the relation between 
context sensitivity and concreteness. 
I will begin with exploring the second thesis, which may be more pertinent to abstract 
concept processing: when processing the concept decision in the context of your choice of 
beverage at 9pm in the local café, the activated properties will be different from when processing 
decision in the context of a judge determining the appropriate sentence for a felon convicted of 
battery. In this sense, decision has a number of possible interpretations, and its precise meaning 
or sense depends on the context in which it is processed. It is perhaps helpful to think of this in 
terms of semantic diversity, which refers to the number and diversity of different contexts in 
which a word can appear, and is positively correlated with error rate in a synonym judgment task 
(Hoffman et al., 2013). It is also strongly negatively correlated with concreteness, such that more 
contextually diverse items tend to be less concrete (i.e., more abstract). This suggests that in 
semantically demanding tasks such as synonym judgment, a greater variety of meanings and 
associated contexts will be activated for contextually diverse concepts. Concepts that occur in 
more diverse contexts may be synonyms, but this may only be the case in particular contexts—
this would then make the search through contexts in which those concepts may be synonyms 
more effortful, as the concepts may not be synonyms in all cases. For example, an abstract 
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concept like decision when paired with judgment might leave fewer resources available to 
process immediately available relational information (i.e., in the present study, the box color or 
the voice) because we must search for a context in which decision and judgment are in fact 
synonyms (i.e., a judge handing down a sentence, but not deciding on your beverage at the café). 
Following this thesis of Yeh and Barsalou (2006), abstract concepts may not be particularly 
sensitive to immediate contextual information (e.g., a box color or a voice), but rather, 
meaningful context may constrain the meaning of otherwise contextually and semantically 
diverse concepts like decision. If this were the case, it would account for why our immediate 
episodic contexts were not well remembered for abstract concepts: without meaningful context to 
constrain the meaning of decision, the semantic associates generated in the synonym judgment 
task would have left fewer resources available to process the immediately available relational 
information (i.e., the association with the box or voice source). 
The first thesis—that concepts and contexts mutually activate each other—on the other 
hand resonates strongly with context availability theory, and likely suggests a concrete word 
advantage: concrete concepts activate contexts more strongly because they have stronger implicit 
connections to specific contexts. Thus, building implicit but direct associations between context 
and concept may have been facilitated by a similar mechanism to that which underpins context 
availability effects—if concrete concepts are typically associated with these sorts of immediate 
contexts, then such contexts (such as the boxes and voices in the present study) might be more 
likely to be encoded with concrete concepts. Further, it is possible that source memory effects 
(and presumably, hippocampal processing) are more closely related to the first thesis, as they 
deal with implicit, proximal connections between stimulus and context (for a review, see 
Eichenbaum, 2013). The neurophysiological evidence to relate source memory effects to 
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concreteness and semantic memory more broadly is sparse, but some hints exist in the literature. 
For instance, an event-related potential study showed a greater P600 (a positive-going 
electrocortical component about 600 ms after stimulus presentation) for concrete than for 
abstract words in the retrieval phase of a directed forgetting paradigm (Xiao et al., 2012), which 
was attributed to a greater amount of implicit context being recalled for concrete concepts (see 
also Rugg & Allan, 2000). Moreover, an fMRI study of recognition memory for abstract and 
concrete concepts showed a relation between hippocampal activation and the behavioral 
concreteness effect (Fliessbach et al., 2006). In this same study, abstract concepts showed greater 
left inferior frontal gyrus activation at encoding, perhaps reflecting a more effortful search for 
relevant contexts and associations. These results suggest that left inferior frontal gyrus was 
involved in finding appropriate contexts and associations, a process more important for abstract 
concepts, and hippocampal activity handled more direct and implicit contextual associations, 
such as those implicated in context availability theory (see also Chen & Lin, 2012). If concrete 
concepts are indeed more sensitive to immediate contextual information, this might explain the 
present findings: implicit contextual associations, such as box color and voice source, are more 
likely to be encoded with concrete concepts because these types of direct contexts are similar to 
those typically recruited when processing concrete concepts. 
Both the hippocampus and inferior frontal and prefrontal regions are important 
components of the episodic memory system, with the former critical in encoding and the latter 
fundamental to the retrieval system (Tulving, 2002). The present results provide an early 
indication that concrete concepts are more amenable to the implicit, immediate contexts to which 
the hippocampus is sensitive. Abstract concepts may be more dependent on frontal memory 
circuits (see also Grossman et al., 2002; Noppeney & Price, 2004; Pexman et al., 2007), which 
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are involved in effortful recollection, and it may be that this frontal memory system helps to 
constrain the pattern of activation that emerges in processing abstract concepts (i.e., selecting the 
context-appropriate associations), depending on the situated context. Of course, testing these 
specific hypotheses using neuroimaging techniques (i.e., fMRI) as opposed to mere conjecture 
based on associated behavioral phenomena will be necessary, and we will return later to a 
potentially promising framework within which these effects might be interpreted. In the next 
section we consider whether what is currently known about the neural processing of abstract and 
concrete concepts is consistent with these hypotheses.  
Neural Representation of Abstract and Concrete Concepts 
Although the present study was behavioral, the goal was to probe potential neural 
mechanisms underlying representation of abstract concepts using a paradigm with well-
established neurobehavioral correlates. Accordingly, it is worth briefly considering what is 
known about neural representation of abstract and concrete concepts in accommodating and 
considering the implications of the present findings. In line with the account presented in the 
previous section, meta-analyses have shown that abstract concepts are associated with inferior 
frontal gyrus activation, in addition to temporal regions such as middle and superior temporal 
gyrus. Concrete concepts, on the other hand, tend to show activation in fusiform gyrus, posterior 
cingulate cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Wang, 
Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010). These findings have been interpreted in line with a dual-
coding framework, suggesting greater linguistic processing in abstract concepts and greater 
image-based processing in concrete concepts (Wang et al., 2010; see also Binder, Westbury, 
McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005). However, the pattern of activation found in meta-
analyses is also consistent with a (not mutually exclusive) context-based account: inferior frontal 
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gyrus is thought to mediate semantic retrieval (Thompson-Schill, 2003; Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, 
Clark, & Poldrack, 2001), which may be more important for abstract concepts because of their 
greater semantic diversity. On the other hand, the greater activation of, for instance, 
parahippocampal cortex in concrete concepts might be reflective of greater reliance on 
immediate and implicit contextual detail, as opposed to the more effortful search that 
characterizes abstract concepts. Indeed, when the task encourages broad semantic processing 
rather than requiring a constrained decision (as may be the case with synonym judgment), 
widespread cortical activation is observed in abstract concepts (across temporal, parietal and 
frontal cortices). This might reflect the highly distributed and diverse semantic representation of 
abstract concepts (Pexman et al., 2007). On the other hand, inferior frontal gyrus would be 
involved in selecting which among these distributed, diverse representations is contextually 
appropriate.  
Concreteness Effects: Reversed 
Potentially informative in understanding the present findings—and more broadly, the 
mechanisms underlying representation of abstract concepts—are situations in which 
concreteness effects are reversed (i.e., an advantage is observed for abstract over concrete 
concepts). Reverse concreteness effects are commonly observed in semantic dementia (e.g., 
Warrington, 1975; Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994), and some have even suggested that 
reverse concreteness effects are typical of semantic processing in semantic dementia (Grossman 
& Ash, 2004). Semantic dementia involves atrophy in the anterior temporal lobes which 
progresses posteriorly as the disease advances, and is characterized by domain-general 
impairments in semantic knowledge but otherwise preserved cognitive and linguistic abilities 
(for review, see Rogers & Patterson, 2007). Because much of this damage extends along the 
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ventral stream (which is critical in object identification and processing) towards posterior 
temporal cortex, behavioral impairment may selectively affect concrete concepts (Bonner et al., 
2009; Yi et al., 2007; but see Hoffman & Lambon Ralph, 2011; Jefferies, Patterson, Jones, & 
Lambon Ralph, 2009 for alternative explanations of reverse concreteness effects). In testing the 
reverse concreteness effect, Loiselle et al. (2012) showed that while patients with anterior 
temporal lobe resection presented with striking reverse concreteness effects, patients with medial 
temporal lobe resection (inclusive of hippocampus primarily, but also amygdala and perirhinal 
cortex) were equally impaired on abstract and concrete concepts. The concreteness deficit among 
those with medial temporal lobe resection was attributed to resection of the perirhinal cortex, 
which is critical in object discrimination (see Clarke & Tyler, 2014) and a sense of familiarity in 
episodic memory (Davachi, 2006), while the abstract concept deficit was attributed to damage to 
the amygdala (which might support emotion concept representation; see also Kousta et al., 2011; 
Vigliocco et al., 2014) and perhaps the hippocampus, which, as was initially hypothesized here, 
might support binding context to concept.  
The concreteness effect can also be reversed at a behavioral level in non-impaired 
populations. Specifically, changing the encoding or retrieval context can affect the patterns of 
accuracy obtained (e.g., Hamilton & Rajaram, 2001; Ruiz-Vargas, Cuevas, & Marschark, 1996; 
ter Doest & Semin, 2005). For instance, concreteness effects are not observed when the 
recognition task tests implicit rather than explicit knowledge of the tested items (Hamilton & 
Rajaram, 2001; ter Doest & Semin, 2005). Related to the discussion in the previous section, it 
may be that explicit cued recall leads to reactivation of a word’s associates, and because abstract 
concepts have more diverse associative networks, interference may occur. Moreover, relational 
processing at encoding may exacerbate concreteness effects (Ruiz-Vargas et al., 1996), perhaps 
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because encouraging relational processing activates the many semantic associates of contextually 
diverse abstract concepts (Hoffman et al., 2013). Thus, relational processing in abstract concepts 
may produce an interference effect at retrieval because more associates are activated at encoding, 
or it may leave fewer resources available to process immediately present contextual information 
at encoding (i.e., the box and voice source in our study).  
These considerations might bear fruitful investigations into the mechanisms underlying 
processing of abstract concepts. Behaviorally, they suggest that altering encoding and/or retrieval 
conditions such that they do not explicitly facilitate relational processing or such that they 
constrain the types of associations that are activated might enhance processing of abstract 
concepts (and perhaps the contexts in which they are placed). Indeed, if abstract concepts are 
represented to a greater degree in associative semantic networks (i.e., Crutch & Warrington, 
2005), then we might anticipate that encouraging relational processing (as we did here in the 
synonym judgment task) would activate more semantic associates of abstract concepts, leading 
to greater interference in the recognition phase, as the foils were selected to be lexically and 
conceptually similar to the targets (see Appendix 1). Evidence for this exists in the higher false 
alarm rates consistently observed for abstract concepts across the present three experiments (see 
Tables 1–3), but because misses were also higher in abstract concepts,1 the nature of false 
memory in abstract concepts must be directly tested. At a neural level, the implications of 
reverse concreteness effects are less clear, given the lack of clarity on the conditions which give 
rise to such reversals. However, a recent model of controlled semantic cognition (Lambon Ralph, 
Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017), which we turn to next, might be helpful in knitting 
together some of the speculations discussed above.  
                                                          
1 The higher miss rate for abstract concepts seems to be largely attributable to misses on synonyms. The hit rates for 
abstract and concrete concepts were 65% and 81%, 76% and 86%, and 72% and 83% in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively.  
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Controlled Semantic Cognition: A Framework for Representation of Abstract Concepts 
The controlled semantic cognition framework (Lambon Ralph et al., 2017) postulates that 
two systems underpin semantic processing, one for semantic representation and one for semantic 
control. Representation is broadly supported by the anterior temporal lobes (which, when 
damaged or resected, lead to reversed concreteness effects; e.g., Loiselle et al., 2012; 
Warrington, 1975), taking in input from modality-specific “spokes,” which are located in 
distributed cortical regions for processing sensory, motor, and perceptual input. While the model 
considers this to be a domain-general ‘hub’ for semantic processing, we remain agnostic to 
whether anterior temporal lobe houses semantic representations, or is a large convergence zone 
at the confluence of many major white-matter tracts (see, e.g., Mirman et al., 2015). More 
importantly for the present purposes, semantic control is supported by a network of frontal 
regions as well as the area surrounding the temporoparietal junction. This system is involved in 
selecting the appropriate semantic properties among semantic associations in a given context. 
We might conjecture that abstract concepts rely to a greater degree on this semantic control 
system in processing, as more diverse meanings must be suppressed and appropriate associations 
retrieved depending on the context. This largely fits with the picture painted above in the section 
on Concreteness, Context, and Episodic Memory: concrete concepts implicitly activate their 
contexts, a result of being less contextually diverse and more imageable, and this implicit context 
activation might portend well to the direct contexts tested here, leading to the observed pattern of 
better recalled contextual information.2 Concrete concepts are more amenable to the first thesis 
                                                          
2 Using Hoffman et al.’s (2013) semantic diversity norms, we tested this hypothesis on our data, despite not all items 
being available in the diversity norms (11% missing). Semantic diversity did not significantly predict word 
recognition across the three experiments, nor did it predict box recognition. However, in Experiment 3, it was a 
significant predictor of voice recognition. This leaves the role of semantic diversity unclear, and suggests that in 
order to tease out its role in relational memory, additional work targeting its role in a hypothesis-driven way is 
necessary.    
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of Yeh and Barsalou (2006), where concepts and contexts mutually activate each other. On the 
other hand, abstract concepts require semantic control for activation. This makes abstract 
concepts more amenable to the second thesis of Yeh and Barsalou (2006): that the specific 
context will determine the properties of the concept that are activated in conceptualization. Such 
a process might rely on the frontal memory system, which is implicated in semantic control, in 
order to drive context-dependent activation of meaning. 
Limitations and Future Work 
An important limitation in the present study was a baseline concreteness effect. Although 
participants were no better at recognizing non-synonym targets (i.e., the only words tested in the 
context recognition task) for concrete than abstract concepts, there was a baseline advantage for 
concrete concepts, as demonstrated in the d' analyses. While word type remained a significant 
predictor of box (Experiment 2) and voice (Experiment 3) recognition even after accounting for 
the d' concreteness advantage, it remains possible that concrete concepts simply produced a 
stronger memory trace, which then led to greater context recognition. Future work should use an 
approach that better addresses this baseline concreteness advantage experimentally. An 
immediate next step will involve presenting all words in boxes at the recognition phase, half with 
the context preserved and half changed; by this method, it could be determined whether there is a 
greater benefit of context preservation for concrete or abstract concepts. Formatting the 
recognition phase in this way would also reduce task demands in the recognition phase—the 
two-part response for word and context was complex, and this may have adversely affected task 
accuracy.  
A further limiting factor of the present approach might be its oversimplification of the 
dimensionality of word meaning. While we attempted to look only at non-emotional abstract 
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concepts such as decision to the exclusion of highly affective concepts like love, this necessarily 
leaves out affect, which is recognized as a critical organizing factor in semantic memory (see De 
Deyne, 2017; Hollis & Westbury, 2016), though it has been shown that abstractness and emotion 
are largely separable in terms of neural representation (Skipper & Olson, 2014). Moreover, while 
some effort has been made to determine the organization of abstract concepts (e.g., Troche, 
Crutch, & Reilly, 2014), we did not consider potential subdivisions within abstract or concrete 
concepts, nor did we consider the emotion dimension. Thus, the present effects cannot be 
considered as representative of all concepts, but instead as reflecting a coarse distinction between 
concrete object concepts and abstract concepts, despite abstractness likely being a continuum, 
with many dimensions (e.g., social, cognitive, philosophical) likely to be important to neural 
processing. For example, it is unclear whether effects of context are uniform across these 
dimensions, whether sensitivity to context varies continuously with concreteness, or whether 
there are important and unexamined interactions between emotion and concreteness in terms of 
sensitivity to context. 
As indicated earlier, the synonym judgment task used in the encoding phase may have 
worked to a disadvantage: as abstract concepts tend to have more diverse meanings, synonym 
judgments may be more difficult for abstract concepts, as it must be determined whether any 
particular sense of the word is a synonym to the target (Hoffman et al., 2013). These systematic 
differences in selection demands may have led to difficulty encoding abstract concepts generally, 
and this possibility is reflected in the higher rates of false alarm observed for abstract concepts in 
the present study. This activation of associated word meanings may have left fewer resources 
available to process the contextual information (although a preliminary analysis of semantic 
diversity was not consistent with this hypothesis, systematic investigation on this explanation is 
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warranted). Accordingly, finding a balance between a sufficiently low-level task to promote 
attention to the context (and avoid overactivation of semantic associates) while still encouraging 
‘deep’ semantic processing will be critical in future attempts to investigate relational memory in 
abstract concepts. Relatedly, while work on episodic memory typically considers low-level 
contextual details such as box frames and voice source to be representative of the rich context 
that can be encoded in a memory episode, future research on context encoding in abstract and 
concrete concepts might benefit from departing from the low-level episodic contexts used in the 
present work. Specifically, while we focused on arbitrary episodic detail, it might be fruitful to 
instead explore systematic contextual relations. Indeed, the activation of systematic contextual 
information might even suppress attention to arbitrary details (see, e.g., van Kesteren et al., 
2013).  
Several suggestions have been made here with regard to the neural representation of 
abstract concepts. While some prior neurophysiological work has intimated at some of the 
suggestions made here (Chen & Lin, 2012; Fliessbach et al., 2006; Grossman et al., 2002; 
Noppeney & Price, 2004; Pexman et al., 2007; Xiao et al., 2012), the current findings present the 
possibility for novel and more theoretically constrained approaches to determining the neural 
mechanism underlying processing and representation of abstract concepts. Specifically, 
investigating the interaction between semantic representation and control in abstract versus 
concrete concepts might be an interesting avenue for exploring the neural mechanisms 
underlying the differential interaction between concept and context in concrete and abstract 
concepts.  
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Conclusions 
 The present set of experiments sought to determine an underlying mechanism uniting 
several approaches to abstract concept representation suggesting that contextual information is a 
critical aspect of the content of abstract concepts (e.g., Schwanenflugel, 1991; Crutch & 
Warrington, 2005; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). However, the findings suggest that 
contextual information is better encoded for concrete concepts, at least when that information is 
a simple and immediate contextual detail such as a box color surrounding a visually presented 
word or the speaker of an auditorily presented word. This is despite the finding that concrete and 
abstract target words were recognized equally well—simply, the context was better encoded for 
concrete concepts. This may be because a similar mechanism underlying the implicit activation 
of contextual information (context availability; Schwanenflugel, 1991) permitted the binding of 
this immediate contextual information to concrete concepts. On the other hand, because abstract 
concepts tend to activate many associates (semantic diversity; Hoffman et al., 2013), and this 
effect is exacerbated by associative tasks like synonym judgment, fewer resources may have 
been available for processing the contextual information alongside abstract concepts. We suggest 
that the sensitivity of abstract concepts to context might be better thought of in terms of semantic 
control, which would help facilitate the appropriate activation of diverse semantic associates 
given the current context.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 
Encoding Phase Target Stimulus Words 
Target words 
Abstract Concrete 
Word Length logF Conc Word Length logF Conc 
agnostic 8 2.94 2 axe 3 5.52 5 
allegory 8 2.48 2.07 basketball 10 6.99 4.97 
allusion 8 1.79 1.58 binoculars 10 4.38 5 
ambience 8 3.61 1.72 blender 7 4.44 5 
analysis 8 6.33 2.56 bottle 6 7.86 4.91 
anomaly 7 4.14 1.79 brick 5 6.25 4.83 
belief 6 5.96 1.19 camera 6 7.97 5 
caveat 6 2.83 2 candle 6 6.01 4.86 
chivalry 8 4.11 1.88 cello 5 4.55 4.96 
comparison 10 5.23 2 chopsticks 10 4.53 5 
concept 7 6.32 1.41 doorknob 8 4.45 4.97 
culture 7 6.57 2.04 envelope 8 6.24 4.93 
democracy 9 5.82 1.78 equipment 9 7.17 4.83 
essence 7 5.66 1.66 figurine 8 2.64 4.86 
esteem 6 4.45 1.83 flashlight 10 5.71 5 
ethos 5 1.95 1.58 football 8 7.56 4.73 
faith 5 7.77 1.63 fork 4 6.11 4.9 
future 6 8.57 1.86 gavel 5 3.66 4.88 
genre 5 3.99 2.37 gearshift 9 2.40 4.64 
gimmick 7 4.01 2.34 glove 5 6.24 4.97 
gist 4 4.03 1.81 hammer 6 6.46 4.77 
hint 4 6.15 2.33 handsaw 7 1.61 5 
innuendo 8 3.83 1.88 harmonica 9 4.49 4.9 
jargon 6 3.43 2.07 hatchet 7 4.61 4.93 
justice 7 7.55 1.45 hose 4 6.02 4.87 
karma 5 5.17 1.93 jar 3 6.05 5 
knowledge 9 7.17 1.73 javelin 7 3.18 4.9 
logic 5 5.83 1.72 lantern 7 4.63 5 
luck 4 8.97 1.33 linoleum 8 3.30 4.85 
merit 5 5.15 1.66 lipstick 8 6.11 4.9 
metaphor 8 5.29 1.94 mallet 6 3.56 4.93 
morale 6 5.35 1.85 mandolin 8 3.18 4.76 
motive 6 6.51 1.5 marble 6 5.58 4.85 
nostalgia 9 3.66 1.83 mop 3 5.35 4.97 
nuance 6 3.04 1.85 napkin 6 5.21 4.93 
oblivion 8 4.62 1.37 paintbrush 10 3.30 4.79 
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paradigm 8 3.61 1.73 pencil 6 6.22 4.88 
persona 7 4.33 2.33 pipe 4 6.90 4.88 
precedent 9 4.84 1.63 pitchfork 9 3.56 5 
prelude 7 3.40 2.33 plate 5 7.18 4.77 
principle 9 5.98 1.7 railing 7 4.32 4.79 
proxy 5 3.83 2.07 rope 4 7.05 4.93 
purpose 7 7.49 1.52 saxophone 9 4.45 5 
religion 8 6.56 1.71 scissors 8 5.83 4.85 
retrospect 10 3.58 1.75 screwdriver 11 4.85 4.9 
rhetoric 8 3.04 1.5 seatbelt 8 3.85 4.79 
sarcasm 7 4.98 1.63 shovel 6 5.86 4.97 
satire 6 3.50 1.96 spatula 7 4.03 4.96 
skeptic 7 3.22 2.31 sponge 6 5.83 5 
soul 4 8.28 1.86 spool 5 3.26 4.62 
spirit 6 7.83 1.6 stapler 7 3.78 4.62 
stigma 6 3.30 1.76 stethoscope 11 3.87 4.86 
strategy 8 6.18 1.93 sword 5 7.20 4.93 
synergy 7 3.43 1.48 telescope 9 5.01 5 
tactic 6 4.37 2.1 thermometer 11 4.72 4.96 
theory 6 7.29 1.47 thimble 7 2.64 5 
verge 5 5.12 2.32 toothbrush 10 5.54 5 
vibe 4 5.58 1.89 ukulele 7 3.37 4.62 
virtue 6 5.57 1.62 umbrella 8 5.95 5 
wisdom 6 6.34 1.53 wrench 6 5.31 4.93 
Mean 6.72 5.03 1.82  7.05 5.06 4.90 
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Table A2 
Non-Target Synonym Pairs 
Abstract Concrete 
Word Length logF Conc Word Length logF Conc Word Length logF Conc Word Length logF Conc 
affinity 8 NA NA rapport 7 3.47 1.84 antiperspirant 14 1.95 4.25 deodorant 9 4.41 5.00 
ambition 8 5.61 1.74 aspiration 10 3.37 1.81 bomb 4 7.91 4.84 grenade 7 5.46 4.90 
appeal 6 6.50 1.73 plea 4 5.86 2.39 bucket 6 6.23 4.96 pail 4 3.87 4.93 
aspect 6 5.28 1.82 dimension 9 5.09 2.50 casket 6 5.09 4.86 coffin 6 6.13 4.86 
atonement 9 2.89 1.44 penance 7 4.29 1.52 cauldron 8 3.18 4.61 pot 3 7.05 4.81 
beginning 9 8.08 2.50 origin 6 5.42 2.03 cigarette 9 7.21 4.88 smoke 5 8.11 4.96 
being 5 10.12 1.93 existence 9 6.39 1.54 coat 4 7.67 4.97 jacket 6 7.44 4.86 
bliss 5 5.08 1.37 ecstasy 7 5.09 2.04 cork 4 4.98 4.86 plug 4 6.27 4.64 
circumstance 12 4.65 1.77 situation 9 8.34 2.03 cup 3 7.88 5.00 mug 3 5.86 4.80 
comfort 7 6.78 2.89 solace 6 4.36 2.04 duvet 5 2.48 4.85 quilt 5 3.66 5.00 
default 7 3.93 2.00 standard 8 6.85 1.83 fiddle 6 5.22 4.81 violin 6 5.49 4.96 
destiny 7 7.07 1.67 fate 4 7.23 1.53 handbag 7 4.90 4.93 purse 5 6.92 4.90 
enlightenment 13 4.30 1.50 insight 7 4.96 1.72 handkerchief 12 5.37 5.00 tissue 6 6.30 4.93 
epiphany 8 4.19 1.60 realization 11 3.99 1.54 luggage 7 6.34 4.83 suitcase 8 6.53 4.97 
fault 5 7.23 2.41 flaw 4 5.04 2.86 magazine 8 7.43 5.00 periodical 10 2.20 3.47 
fiction 7 5.74 2.14 story 5 9.33 3.30 needle 6 6.41 4.93 syringe 7 4.60 4.81 
forecast 8 4.56 2.86 prediction 10 4.19 2.36 oar 3 3.74 4.84 paddle 6 5.25 4.80 
instant 7 6.31 2.70 moment 6 9.16 1.61 platter 7 5.00 4.93 tray 4 6.02 4.74 
peak 4 5.71 4.20 zenith 6 3.09 2.83 safe 4 8.90 3.41 vault 5 6.42 4.62 
rationale 9 2.94 2.13 reason 6 9.20 1.93 sculpture 9 5.07 4.79 statue 6 6.29 4.93 
Mean 
- - -  
7.26 5.73 2.09 
 - - -  
6.19 5.68 4.79 
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Table A3 
Recognition Phase Filler Words 
Abstract Concrete 
Word Length logF Conc Word Length logF Conc 
abstinence 10 3.81 1.72 album 5 6.26 4.69 
accord 6 4.42 1.57 anvil 5 3.47 4.96 
adage 5 3.47 1.86 ball 4 8.59 5.00 
advocacy 8 2.71 2.00 balloon 7 6.09 4.92 
allure 6 3.40 1.92 bandanna 8 3.04 5.00 
altruism 8 2.40 1.50 barrel 6 6.30 4.86 
analogy 7 4.06 1.61 bassinet 8 2.89 4.71 
anonymous 9 6.06 2.03 battery 7 6.45 4.67 
aptitude 8 4.01 1.54 booklet 7 3.33 4.72 
austerity 9 1.61 1.38 boot 4 6.34 4.96 
axiom 5 1.95 2.00 bulb 4 5.30 4.93 
basis 5 6.41 1.83 burlap 6 2.40 4.78 
bias 4 4.41 1.68 button 6 7.27 4.96 
caution 7 5.57 2.04 cabinet 7 6.05 4.89 
chance 6 9.42 1.64 canteen 7 4.47 4.88 
charade 7 4.72 1.93 catalogue 9 4.68 4.36 
charisma 8 3.91 2.07 chandelier 10 4.28 4.79 
choice 6 8.51 1.90 charcoal 8 4.50 4.85 
closure 7 5.06 1.78 cloak 5 5.03 4.71 
coincidence 11 6.85 1.57 clock 5 8.00 5.00 
conspiracy 10 6.27 1.76 corduroy 8 3.53 4.56 
courage 7 7.10 1.52 crayon 6 3.04 4.87 
courtesy 8 6.03 1.77 cushion 7 4.70 4.68 
creed 5 4.86 2.10 diamond 7 6.96 4.89 
dilemma 7 4.89 2.00 diaper 6 5.38 4.82 
dogma 5 2.56 1.79 dice 4 6.28 4.86 
epitome 7 3.09 1.80 drawer 6 6.50 4.67 
ethic 5 3.97 1.59 electronics 11 4.93 4.37 
fascism 7 3.66 1.83 feather 7 5.82 4.90 
freewill 8 1.61 1.85 fence 5 6.71 4.82 
function 8 6.34 1.92 frisbee 7 4.55 4.70 
greed 5 5.50 1.53 garage 6 7.24 4.96 
hiatus 6 3.00 2.07 goblet 6 2.94 4.65 
idea 4 9.82 1.61 helmet 6 6.18 4.92 
identity 8 6.50 2.00 kaleidoscope 12 2.71 4.79 
ideology 8 3.50 1.62 kayak 5 3.26 4.70 
intent 6 5.66 1.52 kettle 6 4.96 4.75 
irony 5 5.45 1.59 knot 4 5.24 4.87 
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jinx 4 5.32 2.03 latch 5 4.58 4.79 
legacy 6 5.55 1.40 leash 5 5.39 4.89 
lenience 8 0.69 1.39 locket 6 4.47 4.82 
liberty 7 6.74 1.85 machete 7 3.97 4.82 
malice 6 4.09 1.72 magnet 6 4.94 4.70 
mercy 5 7.16 1.57 marble 5 5.58 4.85 
monogamy 8 3.83 1.70 medal 5 6.38 4.89 
mortal 6 6.19 1.96 menu 4 6.23 4.67 
norm 4 5.14 2.11 nickel 6 6.07 4.79 
opinion 7 7.67 1.93 oven 4 6.12 4.97 
ordeal 6 4.80 2.04 parachute 9 5.09 4.78 
outlook 7 4.63 1.97 parcel 6 4.26 4.81 
patience 8 6.66 1.66 pebble 6 4.17 4.86 
peace 5 8.17 1.62 photograph 10 6.36 4.89 
phenomenon 10 5.46 2.26 plastic 7 6.86 4.79 
piety 5 3.37 1.56 poncho 6 3.78 4.97 
plan 4 8.91 3.40 pottery 7 4.54 4.72 
plight 6 4.14 2.04 razor 5 5.86 4.90 
potential 9 6.87 1.91 ribbon 6 5.55 4.89 
prestige 8 4.25 1.61 sash 4 4.06 4.67 
priority 8 6.25 1.76 scalpel 7 5.08 4.86 
privilege 9 6.30 1.93 scarf 5 5.48 4.97 
prophecy 8 5.77 1.93 shield 6 6.04 4.66 
protocol 8 5.95 1.97 shingle 7 3.64 4.82 
psyche 6 4.94 1.34 sickle 6 3.33 4.88 
quantum 7 5.65 1.90 silk 4 6.21 4.70 
reform 6 5.21 2.00 spear 5 5.45 5.00 
respect 7 8.20 2.04 splint 6 3.78 4.69 
revenge 7 6.88 1.54 stairs 
6 7.10 5.00 
risk 4 7.82 1.63 stethoscope 11 3.87 4.86 
ruse 4 4.44 1.57 tablet 6 4.33 4.82 
simile 6 2.56 2.04 thread 6 5.57 4.83 
solitude 8 4.62 2.07 ticket 6 7.75 4.70 
symbol 6 6.08 3.11 trampoline 10 3.53 5.00 
taboo 5 1.67 4.13 trident 7 3.18 4.50 
tangent 
7 2.94 2.08 tripod 
6 
3.83 4.72 
tradition 9 6.55 1.69 trophy 6 5.95 4.89 
utopia 6 4.04 1.71 vessel 6 6.17 4.66 
valor 5 4.16 1.85 visor 5 3.40 4.66 
value 5 7.00 1.62 wallet 6 7.06 4.81 
variance 8 2.94 1.84 wire 4 7.25 4.72 
vendetta 8 4.13 2.08 wool 4 5.08 4.86 
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Mean 
6.73 5.12 1.83 
 6.19 
5.19 4.77 
Note. Words in italics only used in Experiment 1. Norms derived from Brysbaert et al. (2014). 
